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NOTES
Federal Regulation of Natural Gas
Companies-The East Ohio Gas Case
THE GROWTH and development of the natural gas industry has been a
business phenomenon of the past seventy years.' This development was
accompanied by business practices which resulted in excessive prices
charged to local consumers.2 Individual states, attempting to protect the
local consumer, found themselves constitutionally unable to control some
natural gas transactions directly affecting local prices.2 In 1938, Congress,
'Fortune, Dec., 1949, p. 107.
2ScHJMAN, THE PETROLE M INDUSTRY 240 (1940): "The Federal Trade Com-
mission concluded in 1934 that fifteen holding company groups controlled over 80
per cent of all the natural-gas trunk pipe lines of the United States." Included in
sixteen specific evils found existent in the gas industry was that of excessive profits
in many natural gas sales between affiliates.
'Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273
U.S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct. 294 (1927); Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co., 265 U.S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544 (1924).
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to provide effective regulation of the industry, bestowed regulatory power
upon the Federal Power Commission by enacting the Natural Gas Act.
4
Section 1 (b) of that Act states:
The provision of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of
natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of
natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, com-
mercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged
in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transporta-
tion or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to
the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering
of natural gas.
The exercise of jurisdiction by the Federal Power Commission under
this section of the Natural Gas Act has been the subject of extensive con-
troversy, culminating in the recent Supreme Court decision in Federal
Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co.5 The East Ohio Gas Co. is en-
gaged in the business of distributing natural gas solely to Ohio consumers.
It purchases the gas within Ohio's boundaries from interstate natural gas
companies, transports it, without reduction in pressure, in its own high
pressure trunk lines to the various city gates, then mechanically reduces the
pressure for entrance into local mains and transmission to consumers. The
FPC ordered East Ohio to prepare and submit financial and statistical
reports in accordance with the Commission's uniform accounting system,
on the ground that East Ohio was subject to FPC control under the Natural
Gas Act.0 The orders were reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia,' but this judgment was upset by the Supreme Court in
a split decision.8 East Ohio was engaged in the "transportation of natural
gas in interstate commerce" within the meaning of the Act, said the Court,
since gas transported in its high pressure trunk lines was in interstate com-
merce, and those high pressure trunk lines were not facilities used in local
distribution and hence were not exempted by the Act from federal regula-
tion. The Court conceded that Congress intended to grant to the FPC
regulatory power only over those transactions which the states lacked power
to regulate. The Court, however, declared that in its decisions prior to the
adoption of the Act the limits of state regulatory power had been de-
"52 STAT. 821, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1938), as amended 56 STAT. 83 (1942), 15
U.S.C. § 717 (Supp. 1949).
'70 Sup. Ct. 266, rehearing denied mem., 70 Sup. Ct. 515 (1950).
'East Ohio Gas Co., 74 P. U. R. (N.s.) 256 (1947).
"East Ohio Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 173 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cit. 1949).
'Mr. Justice Black wrote the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Jackson dissented with
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring. Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Douglas took
no part in the decision.
'The Court summarily dismissed the contention that the words "transportation of
natural gas" of section 1 (b) were intended to mean only the "business" of transport-
ing gas, 70 Sup. Ct. at 268.
[June
termined by the mechanistic test that states could regulate gas coming into
the state from interstate commerce only after the gas had been reduced in
pressure and entered a local distribution system. The Court reasoned that
Congress, in enacting the Natural Gas Act, had intended that this test
should define the limits of the FPC's power to control -whatever the
Court might now consider the limits of the states' regulatory powers.
Two justices'0 dissented, contending that Congress did not manifest
an intention to incorporate into the Act as a measure of the FPC's area of
control the test used by the Court at the time of adoption of the Act for
setting the limits of state regulatory powers, but that even assuming such an
intention, the mechanistic test referred to by the majority of the Court
was not the prevailing test at the time the Act was passed, and so Congress
could not have intended to adopt. that particiular method to determine the
point at which federal regulatory power should begin.
The legislative history of the Natural Gas Act clearly establishes that
the broad purpose of the Act was to provide federal regulation only for
that area of the industry which the states had no constitutional power to
regulate." It was the purpose of the Act not to extend federal regulation
to its constitutional limits, but rather to complement state regulation. It is
difficult to determine whether Congress intended to cast the Act "in the
mold made by prior decisions" defining the limits of state regulatory
power, as contended by the majority in the principal case.' 2 However, the
theory of the majority opinion that the mechanistic formula to which it
referred was conceived by Congress to be the prevailing test of state power,
and was intended by Congress to determine the extent of the FPC's area of
control, is considerably weAkened by the fact that the jurisdictional clause
of the orginal draft of the Act' expressly gave to the FPC jurisdiction over
natural gas companies transporting gas in interstate commerce in high
pressure lines, while the jurisdictional clause of the Act as finally adopted
contained no such reference to the pressure at which gas is transported.' 4
"Jackson and Frankfurter.
uH.R. REP. No. 2651, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1936); SEN. REP. No. 1162, 75th.
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937). See 81 CONG. REC. 9312 et seq. (1937).
270 Sup. Cr. at 275.
"H.R. 11662, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1(b) (1936).
The committee considering the bill discussed the following cases: East Ohio Gas
Co. v. Tax Commission, 283 U.S. 465, 51 Sup. Ct. 499 (1931); Public Utilities
Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83, 47 Sup.
Ct 294 (1927); Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298,
44 Sup. Ct. 544 (1924); Pennsylvania Oas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 252
U.S. 23, 40 Sup. Ct. 279 (1920); Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, 249 U.S.
236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268 (1919). Hearings Before Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce on H.R. 11662, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1936). The majority
opinion in the principal case declared that this fact evidenced Congress' intention to
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If it be assumed that Congress intended to provide federal regulatory
power up to the point at which the Supreme Court had previously declared
state power ended, it is necessary to examine the decisions of the Supreme
Court which defined the limitations of state power prior to adoption of
the Natural Gas Act. The first case considering the problem of a state's
power to regulate rates charged to consumers for the purchase of gas which
had been transported in interstate commerce was Public Utilities Commis-
sion v. Landon,15 decided in 1919. A gas-producing company piped gas
into Kansas from outside the state and sold the gas in Kansas to a distrib-
uting company which resold to consumers. The Kansas commission regu-
lated the price charged by the distributing company to consumers. The
producing company attacked this price regulation on the ground that it
affected that company's interstate business since the price paid by the
distributing company to it was a percentage of the price charged to con-
sumers by the distributing company. The Court, however, held the
regulation valid because interstate commerce ceased when the gas passed
into the mains of local companies having authority to resell. The pressure
at which the gas was transported at any particular stage was not made the
ground for the court's determination of when state power began. The
following year Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service CommissioJ'0 was
decided. In that case a Pennsylvania company transported gas from Penn-
sylvania into New York and sold directly to New York consumers. The
New York commission ordered the company to reduce rates charged to
New York consumers. In upholding the regulation the Court held that
the transmission from the Pennsylvania well to the New York consumer
constituted interstate commerce until the gas reached the consumer's
burner tips, but that the furnishing of gas to the consumer was local in
character under the doctrine of Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the
Port of Philadelphia,7 and therefore could be regulated by the state in
which it occurred until Congress subjected the transaction to its own
regulation.
In both the Landon and Pennsylvania Gas cases, the power of the state
to regulate the retail sale to local consumers was upheld, although upon dif-
ferent theories. In 1924, however, the court in Missouri ex rel. Barrett v.
adopt the mechanistic formula. However, many statements in the committee reports
indicate that the significance attached to these cases by the committee was not dear.
See Hearings, supra at 72, 91. The lack of definiteness in the terms employed in §
1 (b) led to later proposals to redefine these terms. Hearings before Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 2185, H.R. 2235, H.R. 2292, H.R. 2569,
and H.R. 2956, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
" 249 U.S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268.
1"252 U.S. 23, 40 Sup. Ct. 279 (1920).
1712 How. 299 (U.S. 1851).
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Kansas Natural Gas Co.-" created an area into which state regulatory power
could not extend. Missouri had attempted to fix the price charged by a
carrying company which transported gas from outside Missouri into the
state and sold to Missouri distributing companies for resale to Missouri
consumers. The price-fixing was held invalid, on the ground that the
transmission and sale for resale constituted interstate commerce, and a
state enactment imposing a direct burden on interstate commerce must
fall even though Congress has not seen fit to regulate that particular part
of interstate commerce. However, the Court stated that interstate com-
merce ended with the delivery of the gas to the distributing company, and
the subsequent sale by the distributing company to consumers was a sale
in intrastate commerce and subject to state regulation?1
The mechanistic test made its first appearance in 1931, in the case of
East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission.2  East Ohio bought gas at the
state lines and transported it in high pressure pipelines to local mains where
pressure was reduced for sale to local consumers. The Court, declaring
that the transmission of the gas from the out-of-state wells to the local
mains was interstate commerce, but that this interstate commerce ended
upon entrance of the gas into the local mains, held valid an Ohio excise
tax measured by gross receipt from sales by East Ohio to local consumers.
The Court likened the reduction of pressure at the point of entrance to
the local mains to the "breaking of an original package, after shipment in
interstate commerce, in order that its contents may be treated, prepared for
sale and sold at retaiL"2 ' The Pennsylvania Gas case was expressly disap-
proved to the extent that it held that interstate commerce continued until
the gas is delivered to the consumer's burner tips.
Within one year the Court rejected the mechanistic test in another tax
case. In State Tax Commission v. Interstate Natural Gas Co.22 Mississippi
'265 U.S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544.
"The Kansas Natural Gas case and Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v.
Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct. 294 (1927), taken to-
gether, created a "gap" in the natural gas industry between the processes of produc-
tion and consumption from which state regulatory power was excluded. The
Attleboro case, although involving regulation of electricity, has been uniformly con-
sidered to apply to and limit state power over natural gas companies. In that case
Rhode Island was denied power to regulate the price charged to a Massachusetts
distributing company for electricity generated in Rhode Island.
' 283 U.S. 465, 51 Sup. Ct. 499.
2 2 8 3 U.S. at 471, 51 Sup. Ct. at 501. It would seem that since a state dearly could
regulate the rates charged by East Ohio to consumers, it certainly should be able to
tax the sales. Therefore, it is difficult to see why the Court found it necessary to
allude to the reduction of pressure in upholding the tax here. Cf. 58 HARv. L. REv.
1072 (1945).
=284 U.S. 41, 52 Sup. Ct. 62 (1931).
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attempted to exact its franchise tax from a pipeline company which trans-
ported gas into Mississippi and sold it at wholesale to distributing com-
panies. In some instances delivery was made at reduced pressure for the
accommodation of the distributors. In refusing to permit Mississippi to
apply its tax to the pipeline company, the Court held that the sale and
delivery to the distributors constituted interstate commerce. The reduction
in pressure was characterized as incidental to the interstate sale and de-
livery, and an event not divesting the interstate transaction of its inter-
state nature.
The court returned to the mechanistic test to aid in the determination
of a still later case, Southern Natural Gas Corp. v. Alabama.2" In that
case Alabama sought to apply a franchise tax based upon a foreign gas
company's property lying within the state. The company was licensed to
do business in Alabama, and maintained its principal office in that state,
from which the entire management of the business was conducted. It
purchased gas outside the state, piped it into Alabama, and there resold and
delivered it to local distributing companies and to one industrial con-
sumer. The company provided service pipes through which to conduct
gas from its main pipelines onto the property of the industrial consumer,
and, to accommodate the consumer, meters to reduce pressure at the point
of delivery to the consumer. The Court held that the company was not
engaged solely in interstate commerce, and therefore the privilege tax, not
directly burdening interstate commerce, was valid. The Court stressed the
providing of service lines and the reduction of pressure in concluding that
the sale to the consumer was a local activity.
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas," a regulation case decided immediately
prior to the passage of the Natural Gas Act, by-passed the mechanistic test.
A Texas company transported gas through pipelines which it operated in
Texas and Oklahoma. It then sold this gas to affiliated distributing com-
panies in Texas. The Texas commission attempted to regulate the price
charged to the affiliated distributing companies for gas produced and de-
livered in Texas and also for gas produced and delivered in Texas and also
for gas produced in Oklahoma and transported through the company's
lines into Texas, on the ground that the property of the company comprised
one integrated system. The Court upheld the Texas commission, declaring
that the sale to the distributing companies of gas transported from Okla-
homa was an essential part of the intrastate business of selling to con-
sumers.
The decision in the Lone Star case is particularly disrupting to the
theory of the majority opinion in the principal case that reduction of pres-
n301 U.S. 148, 57 Sup. Ct. 696 (1937).
'304 U.S. 224, 58 Sup. Ct. 883 (1938).
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sure is the test distinguishing between federal and state power to regulate.
The clear implication of the Lone Star case is that prior to the Natural Gas
Act state regulatory power extended to the integrated facilities of a local
distribution system even though some of these facilities lay beyond the
state lines. In the principal case East Ohio's high pressure facilities were
even more closely integrated into a local system than were those in the
Lone Star case. Therefore, it would seem that under the Lone Star hold-
ing East Ohio's high pressure facilities would have been considered a
proper subject for state regulation before the passage of the Natural Gas
Act.
These decisions preceding the adoption of the Natural Gas Act mani-
fest the Supreme Court's refusal to fix arbitrarily the limits of state regu-
latory power. Rather, the decisions appear to have been applications of
the flexible rule that, until regulation of a field of interstate commerce has
been pre-empted by Congress, transactions in that field which are essen-
tially local in nature are proper subjects of state regulation. Thus, state
regulatory power over companies engaged in the business of selling retail
to consumers was always upheld; and, although state regulatory power
over companies engaged in the business of selling wholesale to distributors
for resale was generally denied, if the wholesale company and a retail
company formed but units of a single corporate entity whose purpose was
to sell gas to consumers, state power was acknowledged. In reaching this
determination of whether the transaction sought to be regulated was suf-
ficiently local in nature to admit of state regulation, resort was never had to
the mechanistic test. Only in" the solution of the problem of state tax power
over a natural gas company was that test invoked, and even then not
consistently.
Prior to the principal case, decisions of the Supreme Court construing
the Natural Gas Act have failed to produce any consistent interpretation
of the Act's jurisdictional clause. Certainly the cases have failed to con-
sistently apply the mechanistic test. In Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central
Illinois Public Service Co.,2 5 the complainant, a wholly-owned subsidiary
of an interstate gas company, owned pipelines solely within Illinois. It
purchased gas transported into Illinois by the parent company at high pres-
sure, reduced the pressure and sold the gas to Illinois distributing com-
panies and industrial consumers. The Illinois commission ordered the
complainant to extend its Illinois pipelines to connect with and supply gas
to an additional distributing company. The Court held that the Illinois
commission was without authority to issue the order, since the complainant
was engaged in interstate commerce in the purchase and sale of gas moving
'314 U.S. 498, 62 Sup. Ct. 384 (1942).
19501
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
in a continuous stream from outside the state into its pipes, and therefore
came within the specific provision of the Natural Gas Act establishing
federal regulation of sales for resale in interstate commerce.2"
The majority in the principal case relied heavily on the Illinois Natural
Gas case to establish that East Ohio's high pressure lines did not constitute
facilities used in local distribution. 7 The Court reasoned that since the
Illinois Natural Gas Co.'s lines lay wholly within one state, and yet were
not considered to be facilities used in local distribution, East Ohio's like-
wise could not come within the local distribution exception. The Court,
stating that the local distribution proviso of Section 1(b) ". . . cannot
mean one thing for 'transportation' and another where 'sale for resale' is
involved,"28 considered immaterial the fact that the Illinois Gas case in-
volved a company selling for resale, while the principal case involved a
company selling direct to consumers. The Court's analysis would seem to
be in error. In the Illinois Gas case the contention that the company's
facilities were used in local distribution was not raised and was not passed
upon by the Court. Therefore that case could be authority only for the
view that East Ohio's high pressure lines were in interstate commerce, and
not for the view that they were not facilities used for local distribution.
More fundamentally, it seems probable that the phrase "local distribution"
means sale to consumers, and that the exemption of local distribution from
federal regulation could only apply to retail sales to consumers, and never
operate as an exception to the federal regulation of sales for resale in inter-
state commerce. This construction of Section 1 (b) is bolstered by the fact
that in every natural gas case in which the term "local distribution" was
employed, it was used to refer to transactions culminating in sales to con-
sumers. If this construction is correct, the only issue which the Court in
the Illinois Gas case could have decided was whether the sales by the com-
pany for resale were in interstate commerce, not whether they came within
the "local distribution" exception.
The mechanistic test was once again invoked in Colorado-Wyoming
Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission.29 In that case the complainant pur-
chased gas in Colorado from an interstate pipeline company, and sold the
gas in Colorado for resale to domestic consumers. In addition, it trans-
21 In view of the Act's express reference to wholesale sales in interstate commerce, the
Court declared that it did not have to decide whether the fact of pressure reduction
was of any significance in determining state or federal power to regulate. It would
seem, therefore, that the Court in that case, contrary to the majority opinion in the
principal case, regarded the Natural Gas Act as supplanting rather than adopting
prior decisions relating to the extent of regulatory power. It did not, however, deny
that the power given to the FPC by Congress is only that power which states lack.
" 70 Sup. Ct. at 271.
Ibid.
n324 U.S. 626, 65 Sup. Ct. 850 (1945).
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ported part of this gas to Wyoming and there sold it to an affiliated distrib-
uting company for resale. In finding that complainant's revenues were in
excess of costs and a fair return, the FPC considered the costs incident to
selling for resale in Colorado, on the ground that these sales for resale were
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Complainant contended that
these sales were in intrastate commerce and therefore not subject to FPC's
jurisdiction. The Court, however, held that complainant's wholesale sales
in Colorado were sales in interstate commerce for resale for ultimate public
consumption, for the reason that the gas moved in a continuous stream
across state lines to distributing companies in Colorado and Wyoming, and
therefore the sales were subject to FPC regulation. The Court stated that
this commerce did not end until the gas entered the service pipes of the
distributing companies -that is, until pressure was reduced.30 Here again
the sales involved were wholesale sales, and again no contention was made
that these sales constituted local distribution.
The Court refused to base its decision on the intensity of the pressure
at which gas was transported in two other cases decided under the Natural
Gas Act. In the first of these, Interstate Natural Gas Co. V. Federal Power
Commission,31 a producing company owning gas wells in Louisiana trans-
ported gas from the wells through Mississippi and back into Louisiana,
where sales were made to three distributing companies and to industrial
consumers. The producing company also sold and delivered gas at well
pressure to pipeline companies, which then increased the pressure and
transported the gas to other states for resale. The FPC attempted to regu-
late the price charged by the producing company to the Louisiana distribu-
tors and consumers and also the price charged to the pipeline companies.
The producing company admitted FPC jurisdiction over the former sales,
but contested jurisdiction over the latter sales. The Court sustained FPC's
jurisdiction over the sales to the pipeline companies, stating that the gas
was in interstate commerce before it reached the lines of the interstate pipe-
line companies because of the continuous interstate movement. The in-
crease of pressure by the pipeline companies was regarded as "merely an
incident in the interstate commerce rather than as its origin."32 In support
of its conclusion the Court cited State Tax Commission v. Interstate Natural
Gas Co.33 and the Illinois Natural Gas case.3" Those cases, as shown above,
' Complaintant also sold gas direct to industrial consumers in Colorado. It was not
stated whether the FPC asserted jurisdiction over these sales. However, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that it did, for complainant would certainly have raised the local
distribution exception to contest FPC jurisdiction over those sales.
3 331 U.S. 682, 67 Sup. Ct. 1482 (1947).
' Id. at 689, 67 Sup. Ct. at 1486.
Note 22 supra.
"4Note 25 supra.
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considered reduction of pressure to be immaterial in determining whether a
state could tax or regulate wholesale sales to distributing companies. If the
pressure at which gas is transported is not significant in determining state
power over sales to pipeline companies or to distributing companies, it
seems illogical to attribute significance to pressure in determining state
power over sales to consumers.
In the second case in which the intensity of pressure was considered
unimportant, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion of Indiana,35 the Court expressly repudiated the mechanistic test. In
that case a pipeline company transported gas from Texas into Indiana, re-
duced the pressure and sold the gas both to distributing companies and to
industrial consumers. The Indiana commission ordered the pipeline com-
pany to file tariffs and annual reports as initial steps in a plan of regulation
leading ultimately to possible regulation of rates and service in sales direct
to consumers. The Court held that the transportation interstate and sale
to consumers constituted interstate commerce, but since states before adop-
tion of the Natural Gas Act had power to regulate sales direct to consumers,
even though made by an interstate pipeline company, and since the Act
was intended to complement rather than to supplant state power, the state
commission had power to take necessary action looking to regulation of the
sales. The Court expressly rejected the mechanistic test as a device for
determining the existence of state regulatory power, suggesting instead
that the nature of the state regulation, the objective of the state, and the
effect of the regulation upon the national interest in the commerce regu-
lated should all be considered in deciding whether state regulation should
be upheld. 36 Since it seems clear that the broad intention of Congress was
to preserve in state regulatory bodies control over transactions primarily
of local interest, the subjective method by which the court in the Panhandle
Eastern case determined the existence of state power to regulate seems
more realistic than the mechanistic test used in the principal case. In Con-
necticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission,37 decided under
'332 U.S. 507, 68 Sup. Ct. 190 (1947).
"' If the rationale behind the Panhandle Eastern case had been applied by the Court
in the principal case, the language of the Natural Gas Act would be more meaning-
ful than it is now rendered. The Panhandle Eastern case would appear to repudiate
the view that states may under the Act regulate only intrastate operations of a natural
gas company. In the principal case the majority contends that states may regulate
only after interstate commerce has ended, and that "interstate commerce" and "local
distribution" are exclusive of each other. This contention renders the local distribu-
tion exception mere "surplusage." 70 Sup. Ct. at 270 n. 11. The wording of Sec-
tion 1 (b) would seem to indicate, however, that "local distribution" was intended
to constitute a positive exception to the grant of jurisdiction, instead of a redundant
explanation of the nature of the grant.
' 324 U.S. 515, 65 Sup. Ct. 749 (1945).
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the Federal Power Act, 38 the Court employed such a subjective test to de-
termine whether a distributor of electricity was subject to the jurisdiction
of the FPC. The company operated wholly within the state of Connecti-
cut. It received power from interstate lines at high voltage, stepped down
the voltage and sold the power direct to consumers. The FPC, relying
upon the East Ohio Tax case, found that the company was a "public utility"
within the meaning of the Federal Power Act, because its high voltage lines
were in interstate commerce, and therefore that the company was subject
to the Commission's regulation. The Supreme Court, in reversing the
Commission, held that although the company was engaged in the "trans-
mission of electric energy in interstate commerce," the high voltage lines
were "facilities used in local distribution 3 and therefore exempt from
federal regulation.
The decision in the principal case produces far-reaching economic and
political results. One direct economic effect on the company and ultimately
on the consumers will be the cost of complying with the requirement of
the FPC to submit reports and records. Prior to this decision East Ohio
had valued its property according to the theory of reproduction cost new.40
The FPC requires that the reports submitted be based on the original cost
theory of valuation.41 In the hearing before the FPC the president of East
'41 STAT. 1077 (1920), as amended, 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 792 et
seq. (1940).
nId. at 848, 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1940).
'0 OHIO GEN. CODE § 499-9 as construed makes it mandatory that the Ohio Public
Utilities Commission base its determination of property valuations upon the repro-
duction cost new less depreciation. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion of Ohio, 133 Ohio St. 212, 12 N.E.2d 765 (1938). Rosenbaum, Some Phases
of Valuation by the Ohio Public Utilities Commission, 6 U. oF CIN. L. REv. 22
(1932).
"Historically, the Supreme Court has favored the reproduction cost theory of valua-
tion of property over the original cost method. Gradually, however, the Court de-
creased judicial review over commission findings until the FPC was released from
the force of Supreme Court decisions requiring the use of reproduction cost. It has
since used the basis of original cost. Welch, Status of Regulatory Commissions Un-
der the Hope Natural Gas Decision, 32 GEO. L. J. 136 (1943). A survey of the
accounting methods used by state commissions in FPC, STATE CoMMISSION JURIS-
DICTION AND REGULATION OF ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES, PREPARED IN CO-
OPERATION WITH NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RAILROAD AND UTILITIES COM-
MISSIONERS, 8 (1948) found that thirty-three state commissions fix rates and of
these, seven base the determination on prudent investment, seven use fair value,
seven use original cost, five consider all elements, one uses reproduction cost, and
five use other methods. For a general appraisal of the accounting practices of the
Federal Power Commission see Kohler, Development of Accounting for Regulatory
Purposes by the Federal Power Commission, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 152 (1945)
(part of a special issue on the Federal Power Commission). For a thorough con-
sideration of the efforts of the FPC to achieve uniformity among state accounting
systems see BAUM, THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION AND STATE UTILITY REGU-
LATION 135 et seq. (1942).
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Ohio estimated the cost of complaince with this requirement to be between
$1,500,000 and $2,000,000.42 The estimate was not questioned on cross-
examination and the FPC offered no evidence to refute it 4 3 It did how-
ever report that experience with other companies indicated that the
estimate was "considerably exaggerated." 44 But regardless of the amount
of the financial burden, it is proper to inquire whether the possession of
these reports by the FPC sufficiently assists effective natural gas regulation
to justify the additional burden on the company and consumers. Since the
FPC cannot regulate the rates charged by East Ohio to consumers,45 the
utility of these reports to the FPC is not readily apparent.46
Moreover, the decision in the principal case throws open the door to
political conflicts between the states and the federal government.47 One
'Brief for the State of Ohio and The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio as Re-
spondents, p. 39, Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 70 Sup. Cr. 266
(1950). "Since 'original cost' studies have to be made according to the FPC of all of
East Ohio's property from the date it was first used to fulfill a public utility obliga-
tion it would require inspection and determination of property and accounts from
1846 to the present time." (citations omitted) Ibid.
'Brief for the State of Ohio and the Ohio Public Utilities Commission, supra note
42 at p. 39, Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 266
(1950).
"East Ohio Gas Co., 74 P.U.R. (N.S.) 256, 263 (1947).
"Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Federal Power Commission, 141 F.2d 27
(7th Cit. 1944).
"See Memorandum in Support of Petition for Rehearing Submitted on Behalf of
the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, and Certain State
Regulatory Commissions as Am'icus Curiae, p. 5, Federal Power Commission v. East
Ohio Gas Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 266 (1950); Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, p. 39.
The only justification advanced by the FPC for imposing this additional accounting
system upon East Ohio is that in order to maintain regulation on a national basis, it
must have information available from a uniform system of accounts. Brief for
Appellants, p. 80, Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 266
(1950). This explanation perhaps supports the many observations that the FPC
is expanding its jurisdiction to the fullest possible extent. See BAUM, THE FEnERA.
POWER COMMIssION AND STATE UTILITY REGULATION 70 et seq. (1942); Alley,
What Makes the FPC Tick?, 45 P.U. FORT. 142 (1950); Bricker, The Significance
of the East Ohio Gas Case, 45 P.U. FORT. 201 (1950); Lippitt, Is the Federal Power
Commission Encroaching on Local Gas Regulation?, 45 P.U. FORT. 13 (1950).
" It is pointed out in the majority opinion of the principal case that the Natural Gas
Act did not purport to abolish all overlapping of jurisdiction. 70 Sup. Ct. at 272.
For a discussion of the jurisdictional conflicts arising out of the principal case see
Bricker, The Significance of the East Ohio Gas Case, 45 P.U. FORT. 201 (1950);
Lippirt, Is the FPC Encroaching on Local Gas Regulation?, 45 P.U. FORT. 13
(1950). For a general survey of jurisdictional disputes with the state commissions
see BAUM, THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION AND STATE UTILITY REGULATION,
c. 2 (1942). The widespread effect of the principal case is illustrated by the fact
that 43 cases presenting similar issues are now pending hearing before the Federal
Power Commission. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, p. 19, Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio
Gas. Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 266 (1950). Proceedings involving eight companies have
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such conflict results from the power of the FPC to fix the rates of deprecia-
tion and amortization of East Ohio's property.48 These rates when fixed
by the FPC may be disregarded by the Ohio commission only for the pur-
pose of determining the price to be charged for gas. Therefore, in approv-
ing or disapproving securities issued by East Ohio, the Ohio commission
will be bound by depreciation rates set by the FPC.45 Another conflict
results from the possession by both the FPC and the Ohio commission of the
power to determine the adequacy of gas reserves held or controlled by
East Ohio 0 Still another conflict may result from the fact that both com-
missions have authority to reallocate East Ohio's gas in times of emergnecy.51
The most obvious conflict is illustrated by the principal case itself. East
Ohio must submit reports concerning its property to the FPC according to
the FPC's original cost theory of valuation.52 East Ohio must also submit
similar reports to the Ohio commission, valuing its property on a reproduc-
tion cost basis.53 There is no practical way to resolve this conflict unless
the state commission abdicates its power to determine its own method of
property valuation and adopts the method required by the FPC. The funda-
mental problem involved is not which system of accounting is preferable,
but whether the states may freely choose the methods of regulation in those
areas in which they have been held competent to act.54 The extension of
jurisdiction by the federal government serves only to embarrass and inhibit
the effective regulation of the natural gas companies by the individual
been formally docketed. These are: Central Natural Gas Corporation, Docket No.
G-264; Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Co., Docket No. G-303; Michigan Consolidated
Gas Co., Docket No. G-353; Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Docket
No. G-1167; The Brooklyn Union Gas Co., Docket No. G-1171; Kings County
Lighting Co., Docket No. G-1190; Eastern Indiana Gas Co., Docket No. G-1200;
and Indiana Gas and Water Co., Docket No. G-1222. The three New York cases
present an example of the extent to which the )Federal Power Commission may be
free to extend its control under the authority of the East Ohio case. Almost all of
the facilities involved are entirely within New York City.
'Under § 9(a) of the Natural Gas Act, supra note 4, the FPC has authority to fix
rates of depreciation and amortization for property of each "natural gas company."
Ohio has delegated similar authority to the Ohio Public Utilities Commission by
OHIo GEN. CODE §§ 614-49, -50. Section 9(a) further provides that state commis-
sions may disregard these rates fixed by the FPC only for the purpose of determining
rates or charges.
0 OHIo GEN. CODE §§ 614-53, -54, -55. Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, p. 41.
'The Natural Gas Act § 14(b) conflicts with OHIo GEN. CODE § 614-8.
"The Natural Gas Act § 4(b) and OHIo GEN. CODE §§ 614-8, -15, -32. Brief for
Respondents, supra note 42, p. 35.
uThe Natural Gas Act § 8(a).
Osno GEN. CODE §§ 614-10, 499-10.
r' See in the principal case the dissent, 70 Sup. Ct 266, 279, discussing the opinion
by Mr. Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct.
371 (1932).
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states.5 Because of the overlapping regulation resulting from the decision
in the principal case, there is increased reason for the FPC and the Ohio com-
mission to take full advantage of the opportunities under the Natural Gas
Act for cooperation in the form of joint hearings and exchange of informa-
tion." However, in view of the apparent antagonism existing between
the FPC and the state regulatory commissions, it is doubtful that full co-
operation can be achieved. The best solution appears to lie in remedial
legislation unequivocally restricting the regulation of local interests to the
local commissions.57
JOHN H. GHERLEiN
See Memorandum in Support of Petitions for Rehearing Submitted on Behalf of
the Louisiana Public Service Commission as Amicus Curiae, p. 2, Federal Power
Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 266 (1950). Similar briefs were
filed on behalf of the States of Georgia and Kansas. An important source of sup-
port was in such a brief filed by the National Association of Railroad and Utilities
Commissioners, stating that it spoke on behalf of 36 state commissions and the com-
mission for the District of Columbia, and declaring that the commissions were "...
concerned over the sweeping effect of the majority decision in this cause, which ex-
pands Federal Power Commission jurisdiction to the extent of curtailing and ren-
dering ineffective current state commission regulation .. "
"BAUM, THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION AND STATE UTILITY REGULATION,
c. VII (1942). At page 272 Baum states, "Based on the foregoing over-all picture,
the writer concludes that the Federal Power Commission throughout its history has
developed and followed with remarkable degree of success an extensive procedure of
collaboration with the states." A contrary view is set forth in Foster, The Federal
Power Commission and State Jurisdiction, Series 4, No. 1 CONTEmPORARY LAW
PAMPHLETS (1940).
"There is now pending before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce a bill which alters the definition, under the Natural Gas Act, of the term
"natural gas company." S. 1831, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). This bill provides:
"... [T]he term 'natural-gas company' does not include any person engaged in
local distribution within a State who receives natural gas within or at the border of
such State into local distribution facilities as herein defined and sells and delivers
such gas (i) to the general public for ultimate consumption therein, or (ii) to an-
other person engaged in local distribution within the same State who sells and de-
livers such gas to the general public for ultimate consumption therein, such sales
and persons being hereby declared subject to regulation by the several States." This
proposed amendment defines "local distribution facilities" to include high pressure
mains such as those used by East Ohio. H.R. 4028, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949)
is an identical bill pending in the House of Representatives. A more recent bill to
the same effect is S. 2964, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
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